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Abstract 
The present study examined the relationship between self-reported levels of self-consciousness 
and competition anxiety among a sample of sportspeople (N = 519). We hypothesized that self-
consciousness would exhibit a positive linear relationship with competition anxiety via the 
mediator of social anxiety and that this relationship would be moderated by gender. Path analysis 
using robust maximum likelihood estimator techniques in EQS were employed to examine model 
fit. Examination of fit indexes demonstrated that the fit of the baseline a priori model was good 
(Robust CFI = .98, SRMR = .06). Multigroup analyses assessing invariance across gender were 
conducted by imposing increasingly strict equality constraints. The models displayed good fit 
(CFI = .96, SRMR = .08); however, inspection of the Lagrange multiplier test and then single 
sample models revealed the path between social anxiety and somatic anxiety was stronger for 
females. We concluded that the relationship between self-consciousness and competition anxiety 
is mediated by the experience of social anxiety; however, the present findings refute the 
hypothesis that the relationship is moderated by gender. 
 
Key words: Confirmatory factor analysis, Revised Self-Consciousness Scale, Sport Anxiety 
Scale, SEM 
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Modeling the Relationship Between Self-Consciousness and Competition Anxiety 
The hotbed of the competitive sports arena can be a stressful place. Athletes often focus 
on themselves, their behaviors, and the way in which they convey themselves to others (Wilson & 
Eklund, 1998). Self-attention can create internal sources of distraction and may influence 
cognition by reinforcing task-irrelevant processing (Moran, 1996). When individuals focus on the 
self, they sometimes become excessively pre-occupied with internally generated fears, worries, 
and expectations, which collectively, can be viewed as the characteristics of an anxious 
individual. Further, it has been postulated that anxiety is a reaction to the process of self-focused 
attention (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975; Gibbons, 1990) and that this process can often have 
a negative impact on performance (Moran, 1996). Conversely, effective management of self-
focus, wherein a balance is struck between focusing on the self, the environment, and the task at 
hand can result in an appropriate mental focus. This facilitates positive cognitions and improves 
flow and performance (Loehr, 1986).  
Self-consciousness is defined as the tendency to either direct attention inwards focusing 
on covert aspects of self that are associated with one’s inner thoughts and feelings, or outwards, 
focusing on aspects of self that are on public display and reflect elements that are most relevant to 
motives involving self-presentation or self-portrayal (Scheier & Carver, 1985). These self-
focusing tendencies are referred to as private and public self-consciousness respectively. A third 
facet of self-consciousness is social anxiety, representing an individual’s reaction to being 
focused on by others. Contemporary perspectives on social anxiety highlight the view that both 
the motive to make a particular impression and the expectation of failing to do so are key 
elements in its production (Schlenker & Leary, 1982). Therefore, it can be suggested that, to 
some degree, self-consciousness is an antecedent of the experience of social anxiety (Schlenker & 
Leary, 1982). 
Athletes can distract themselves (self-focus), and consequently worry (a cognitive 
component of anxiety), experience regrets, and engage in speculation (Lewis & Linder, 1997). 
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Further, Martin and Debus (1999) stated that when attention is directed towards the self, 
individuals are more likely to experience negative affect and make negative judgments about the 
self and the environment. These negative perceptions can demotivate individuals causing 
decreases in the amount of effort devoted to an activity (Leary, 1992). Additionally, Jackson 
(1995) demonstrated that a ‘loss of self-consciousness’ increases the intensity of the flow 
experience. However, when the self becomes salient “flow is disrupted and positive affect 
diminishes” (Silvia, 2002, p. 196). Terms such as “choking” (e.g., Baumeister, 1984), and “icing” 
(e.g., Kozar, Whitfield, Lord, & Mechikoff, 1993) have been used interchangeably to represent 
situations in which performance has been impaired by worries and fears associated with the 
possibility of imminent failure or defeat.  
The dispositional constructs of self-consciousness and competition anxiety have both been 
found to have an impact upon cognitions associated with performance. Competition anxiety has 
been defined as “an individual’s tendency to perceive competitive situations as threatening and 
respond to these situations with state anxiety” (Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990, p. 11) and will 
be used henceforth to represent trait anxiety unless otherwise stated. Research has revealed 
consistently that individuals who score highly on trait anxiety measures experience more state 
anxiety, particularly in highly competitive, evaluative situations when compared to those with 
low trait anxiety (e.g., Donzelli, Dugoni, & Johnson, 1990; Gould, Horn, & Spreeman, 1983; 
Martens et al., 1990). For these reasons, it is important to study competition anxiety and the 
implications it has for the quality of the sport experience and its product (i.e., performance).  
Wilson and Eklund (1998) observed that “the tendency to experience competitive anxiety, 
particularly cognitive anxiety in the form of worries, is closely associated with the tendency to 
perceive self-presentational threat during sport competition” (p. 93). Self-presentational concerns 
were found to be strongly associated with cognitive rather than somatic anxiety, and that 
substantial proportions of variance in competition anxiety could be accounted for by self-
presentational concern variables. Likewise, Gibbons (1990) and Wilson and Eklund (1998) noted 
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that the experience of anxiety is heightened by attention to the self. Further, research has 
identified that individuals experiencing high competition anxiety worry more about factors 
relating to negative social evaluation when compared to individuals experiencing low competition 
anxiety (Dunn & Causgrove-Dunn, 2001; Gould et al., 1983; Passer, 1983). These studies 
primarily represent significant relationships with aspects of public self-consciousness (i.e., 
attention to self, fear of negative evaluation) thus, the current research will extend the knowledge 
base by exploring the role of private self-consciousness in the formation of competition anxiety.   
Previous research within clinical and academic settings has made advances in establishing 
links between public and private self-consciousness and competition anxiety. There is an 
abundance of literature describing the positive relation between heightened self-attention and 
various forms of anxiety (e.g., Lechner & Rosenthal, 1984; Schmitt & Kurdek, 1984; Wells, 
1985). By contrast, Kim, Oh, Moon, and Kim (1999) established that private self-consciousness 
was negatively correlated with trait anxiety, while public self-consciousness and social anxiety 
were positively correlated with trait anxiety.   
The detrimental effects of self-consciousness and anxiety have great relevance for 
sportspeople as they are constantly surrounded by conditions that can engender these mental 
states. Wilson and Eklund (1998) noted that,  “competition is fraught with both real and imagined 
self-presentational risks. The potential exists in competition for athletes to convey a variety of 
negative images of themselves to a variety of evaluative others” (p. 83). Additionally, individuals 
risk being unable to obtain or fulfill personal standards and goals that they set, resulting in the 
perception of personal inadequacy and a potentially negative outcome that one is unable to avert. 
Contrastingly, if responses and perceptions are commensurate with the intended impression or 
goal the individual will perceive that s/he has been successful (Schlenker & Leary, 1982). The 
identification and effective management of emotions that can be evoked within athletic 
competition is an essential requirement for individuals to function successfully and it can be 
suggested that the understanding of these states is, to some extent, dependent on a comprehensive 
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knowledge of their equivalent dispositions, however research within a sporting context remains 
limited. 
Competing Factor Structures for the Revised Self-Consciousness Scale 
Generally, the 3-factor structure of the Revised Self-Consciousness Scale (rSCS: Scheier 
& Carver, 1985) described by Fenigstein et al. (1975) has been retained. However, equivocal 
findings have highlighted the potential for a distinction between two possible dimensions 
contributing to private self-consciousness (self-reflection - the disposition to think about the self 
and internal state awareness - awareness of one’s inner emotional feelings and physiological 
states) (e.g., Martin & Debus, 1999; Watson, Morris, Ramsey, Hickman, & Waddell, 1996), and 
public self-consciousness (appearance consciousness - awareness of one’s external appearance 
and style consciousness - referring to behavioral and stylistic of one’s public image) (Mittal & 
Balasubramanian, 1987), each having opposing directions in relation to aspects of 
psychopathology and mental health. Therefore, it was deemed necessary to assess the factor 
structure prior to conducting further analyses.   
Path Analysis 
Based on existing theory a conceptual baseline model (Model 1; see Figure 1) was 
proposed to explain the relationship between the concepts. We hypothesized that social anxiety 
would show a positive relationship with the three factors of competition anxiety, as they are all 
essentially components of the same concept. Additionally, when Fenigstein et al. (1975) 
originally conceptualized self-consciousness, they reported that social anxiety occurred as a result 
of self-focus. Further research has supported this contention (Lechner & Rosenthal, 1984; Wells, 
1985; Wilson & Eklund, 1998). Therefore, based on these findings we hypothesized that paths 
specified between the public and private self-consciousness factors and social anxiety would 
display a direct significant relationship. When individuals doubt that they will achieve their 
desired presentational goal, a discrepancy between the ideal self and actual self occurs which 
manifests in social anxiety (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990).  
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Two additional models were tested (see Figure 1). Essentially, they take the same form with the 
exception of two parameters. Model 2 had additional paths between style consciousness and 
worry, and appearance consciousness and worry (they are directly associated with a person’s 
public self; hence, it was anticipated this would be reflected in a person’s disposition to 
experience ruminative thoughts/worry) and model 3 had paths between style consciousness and 
worry, and self-reflection and worry (it can be suggested that ruminative thinking/worry is by 
definition linked to self-reflection - the disposition to self-ruminate).  
Moderating Effects of Gender 
Previous research has demonstrated that females report significantly greater symptom 
intensity for self-consciousness (e.g., Alanazi, 2001; Sowa & LaFleur, 1986; Wells, 1985) and 
trait anxiety (e.g., Jones, Swain, & Caleb, 1991; Sowa & LaFleur, 1986; Wiggins, 2001) 
compared to males. Further, societal demands and conditioning during human development might 
account for the proposed differences (Markula, 2001). Females are bombarded with images that 
convey notions of acceptable self-presentational styles and behaviors, creating environments in 
which they continually self-evaluate and experience varying degrees of social anxiety (Markula, 
2001). Such perceptions are maintained across many different life domains, including sport. In 
this sense, females are more in tune with their emotional and physiological states and the way 
others perceive them (social evaluation) (Markula, 2001). In light of such findings, it was finally 
hypothesized that the specified model may, to some degree, be moderated by gender.  
Method 
Participants 
Five hundred and nineteen sportspersons from southern England volunteered to 
participate. The sample comprised 287 males and 232 females, aged 18 to 56 years (M = 20.22 
years, SD = 2.85 years). Participants were all attending weekly training sessions and competing 
on a regular basis. They were of club (n = 318), county (n = 102), regional (n = 30), national (n = 
34), and international (n = 35) level and reported that they had competed at that present level for a 
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mean of 61.18 months (SD = 44.71 months) and had been participating in their sport in total for a 
mean of 115.20 months (SD = 52.17 months). Three hundred and seventy-six of the participants 
were involved with team sports (e.g., association football, rugby union, netball), while the 
remaining 143 were drawn from individual sports (e.g., track and field, swimming, tennis). 
Measures 
Self-consciousness. Levels of self-consciousness were assessed using the Revised Self-
Consciousness Scale (rSCS: Scheier & Carver, 1985). The original factor structure assessed three 
dimensions of self-consciousness: Private self-consciousness, Public self-consciousness, and 
Social anxiety (Scheier & Carver, 1981). The rSCS comprises 22 items, rated on a 4-point Likert-
type scale, anchored by 0 (“not at all like me”) and 3 (“a lot like me”). Scheier and Carver (1985) 
reported acceptable internal consistency (α > .75) and test-retest reliability (r > .74) for all 
subscales. However, owing to purported weaknesses in the original factor structure, researchers 
have reconstructed it. In most instances, reconstruction concerned the private subscale (Anderson, 
Bohon, & Berrigan, 1996; Burnkrant & Page, 1984; Martin & Debus, 1999), resulting in two sub-
components: Self-reflection and Internal state awareness. Additionally, Mittal and 
Balasubramanian (1987) reconstructed the public subscale resulting in two sub-components 
reflecting Style consciousness and Appearance consciousness. Therefore, confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) was employed to test competing factor structures.  
Competition anxiety. Competition anxiety was assessed using the Sport Anxiety Scale 
(SAS: Smith et al., 1990). The SAS was developed in conjunction with Smith et al.’s (1990) 
Conceptual Model of Sport Performance Anxiety in response to calls for a sport-specific 
multidimensional measure of trait anxiety (Smith et al., 1990). The 21-item questionnaire 
assesses three dimensions of trait anxiety: Somatic anxiety, Self-doubt/worry, and Concentration 
disruption. Somatic anxiety evaluates the tendency for individuals to experience anxiety-related 
perceptions of autonomic reactivity. The cognitive subscales of worry and concentration 
disruption evaluate a competitor’s tendency to experience ruminative thinking and attentional 
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disturbances respectively (Smith et al., 1990). Items are rated on a 4-point Likert-type scale, 
anchored by 1 (“not at all”) and 4 (“very much so”). The SAS subscales have demonstrated good 
internal consistency (α > .81), relatively high test-retest reliability (r = .85), as well as convergent 
and construct validity (see Smith et al., 1990; Smith, Smoll, & Wiechman, 1998). However, the 
original factor structure has been questioned (Dunn, Causgrove-Dunn, Wilson, & Syrotuik, 
2000). Specifically, Dunn et al. (2000) reported that, from a conceptual and empirical standpoint, 
a better fitting model was obtained when paths directed from items 14 and 20 originate from 
worry rather than concentration disruption as conceptualized originally. Additionally, given that it 
is a relatively new instrument, there is limited published empirical research available confirming 
its factor structure. Therefore, CFA was performed using the present data to assess the relative 
goodness-of-fit of competing factor structures.  
Concentration Grid. In order to minimize the possibility of multiple questionnaire 
interference, that is the cognitive processes used to answer one questionnaire producing a carry-
over effect to the next questionnaire (Meltzoff, 1998; Thomas & Nelson, 2001), and to maintain 
cognitive arousal, participants completed the Concentration Grid (CG: Harris & Harris, 1984). 
The CG consists of a 10 by 10 grid containing all numbers between 00 and 99 in a non-sequential 
order. Participants are given one minute to cross-off the numbers in ascending numerical order 
starting with a number that is specified at random by the researcher.   
Procedure 
Permission was sought from coaches to invite the sportspeople in their charge to 
participate in the present study. Following solicitation of informed consent, the questionnaire 
package was administered. The questionnaires appeared in the following order: rSCS, 
demographics, CG, and SAS. Administration occurred prior to a training session and the test 
groups ranged in size from 20-50. Once participants had completed the measures up to and 
including the demographic details, they had a written instruction to stop and await further 
instructions (the importance of this instruction was highlighted by the first author before 
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participants began the completion of the instruments). Having waited for all participants in the 
test groups to reach this point, the 1-minute period in which the CG was completed was timed by 
the first author, after which participants were instructed to complete the final instrument (the 
SAS). Participants took approximately 15 minutes to complete the package of questionnaires.  
Prior to and during the testing period no reference was made to the constructs under 
investigation for reasons indicated by Meltzoff (1998, pp. 75-78). Participants completed the 
instruments in silence and without interference or distraction. The importance of providing 
honest and dominant responses was emphasized to participants. They were also assured that 
their responses would be kept in strict confidence to avoid response bias.  
Data Analysis 
Data analysis comprised four distinct phases. Initially, CFA was used to assess the 
tenability of the factor structure of the rSCS and the SAS. CFA for the present study was 
conducted using Bentler’s (1995) EQS (v. 5.7) statistical program utilizing the maximum 
likelihood method and a covariance matrix.  A four-index presentation strategy to evaluate the 
adequacy of the models both in this phase and the final phase was employed. The goodness-of-fit 
indexes consisted of chi-square (χ2), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Standardized Root Mean 
Squared Residual (SRMR), Root Mean Square of Approximation (RMSEA) and Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) representing both absolute and incremental fit indexes. Cut-off 
values close to .95 for CFI, .08 for SRMR, and .06 for RMSEA are considered acceptable (Hu & 
Bentler, 1999), whereas AIC adjusts model chi-square to penalize for model complexity and the 
lowest AIC value represents the best fitting model. Owing to variations in the performance of fit 
indexes relative to sample size and distributional misspecification, it has been suggested that a 
multiple index strategy including both absolute and incremental indexes is a better way to 
distinguish good fitting models from poor ones including those with misspecified factor 
covariance(s), factor loading(s), or both (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
In the second phase, the distributional properties of the dependent variables were assessed.  
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Path analysis utilizing EQS was adopted in the third phase to examine the relationship between 
self-consciousness and competition anxiety based on the a priori models. Finally, in the fourth 
phase, multigroup analysis was conducted, imposing increasingly stricter equality constraints on 
parameters to examine whether the model was generalizable or invariant across gender groups.  
Results 
Distribution of the Data 
Multivariate normality is an assumption that underlies the use of statistical modeling; 
therefore, it was assessed using Mardia’s coefficient of multivariate kurtosis (Mardia, 1970). 
Analysis using EQS revealed that the data violated the multivariate normality assumption 
(multivariate kurtosis normalized estimate = 9.73); therefore, robust maximum likelihood 
estimation was employed in CFA to account for the violation. Univariate kurtosis values ranged 
from –0.33 to –1.07 (M kurtosis value = -0.61, SD = 0.20). 
CFA of the Factor Structures of the rSCS and SAS  
Robust maximum likelihood CFAs were conducted using EQS (Bentler, 1995) to test 
the comparative fit of the a priori factor structures of the original model of the rSCS proposed by 
Scheier and Carver (1985; rSCS 1) and alternative models proposed by Anderson et al. (1996; 
rSCS 2), Burnkrant and Page (1984; rSCS 3), Martin and Debus (1999; rSCS 4), and Mittal and 
Balasubramanian (1987; rSCS 5). Dunn et al. (2000) indicated that the purpose of specifying 
alternative models is to provide the researcher with an opportunity to compare model goodness-
of-fit indexes to determine which model provides the best fit to the data. Although in all cases 
(other than the factor structure of rSCS 4), the goodness-of-fit indexes of alternative models were 
superior to those of the original model (see Table 1) it is acknowledged that they did not meet 
traditional fit criteria. However, each subscale is modeled as a distinct construct and it was not the 
purpose of the study to restructure the rSCS; therefore, for the purpose of carrying out further 
analyses, the best fitting model was used. Based primarily on CFI and AIC, the 5-factor structure 
proposed by Mittal and Balasubramanian (1987; rSCS 5) was adopted.   
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 The values of standardized loadings ranged from .44 to .81 with an average value of .62, 
which exceeds the accepted minimum single loading of .40 (Ford, MacCallum, & Tait, 1986). In 
addition, the reliability of individual items and the composite reliabilities of subscales were 
calculated using Bagozzi’s (1981) reliability equations. Item reliability ranged from .18 to .49, 
and the reliability of the composite factors was .60 (self- reflection), .49 (internal state 
awareness), .66 (style consciousness), .71 (appearance consciousness), and .75 (social anxiety). 
Cronbach (1951) alpha values for the five subscales were .64 (self-reflection), .53 (internal state 
awareness), .78 (style consciousness), .77 (appearance consciousness), and .79 (social anxiety). 
CFA was repeated for the original factor structure of the SAS proposed by Smith et al. 
 (1990; SAS 1) and the alternative factor structure proposed by Dunn et al. (2000; SAS 2). 
Again, based primarily on the CFI and AIC, the alternative model displayed superior fit, and 
was therefore adopted for further analysis. The values of the standardized loadings ranged from 
.52 to .93 with an average value of .71; thus, the loadings exceeded the accepted minimum of 
.40 (Ford et al., 1986). Reliability values (Bagozzi, 1981) were also calculated for the SAS; 
item reliability ranged from .24 to .71 and reliability values of the factors were .88 (somatic 
anxiety), .85 (worry), and .72 (concentration disruption). Cronbach (1951) alpha values for the 
three subscales were .91 (somatic anxiety), .89 (worry), and .76 (concentration disruption). 
In order to establish whether there was a significant difference between genders, and 
by extension, the viability of gender as a moderator variable, a one-way between-groups 
MANOVA was performed. A main effect for gender was found (Hotteling’s T = .13, F8, 435 = 
7.06, p <.001, η2 = .12). Step-down F tests revealed significant differences between style 
consciousness, social anxiety, somatic anxiety, concentration disruption, and worry (see Table 
2).  Although not every factor was were significant, we decided to examine the possible 
moderating effect of gender, as the mediating factor of social anxiety and all other anxiety 
factors were significantly different.  
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Path Analysis  
To examine the pattern of associations between the subscales of self-consciousness and 
competition anxiety, path analysis using the robust maximum likelihood method was employed to 
test the a priori models. Examination of the overall fit indexes demonstrated that the fit of all 
models was very good (see Table 3). In the cases of both M2 and M3, standardized solutions 
revealed the specified path between style consciousness and worry was very weak (.08 and .07 
respectively), additionally, the Wald test indicated that the specified paths between appearance 
consciousness and worry (M2), and self-reflection and worry (M3) should be dropped to improve 
the parsimony of models. Therefore, on this basis, the baseline model (M1) was accepted for 
further analysis (see Figure 2). Z-test scores revealed that all paths were significant with the 
exception of the path between self-reflection and social anxiety. 
In order for the model to be generalizable, it should demonstrate similar properties 
across populations. If models do differ significantly, this highlights important implications 
regarding coaching techniques and intervention strategies employed for different groups of 
individuals. Therefore, given the nature of previous findings (e.g., Alanazi, 2001, Larry, 2000, 
Markula, 2001), the specified model was assessed for moderating effects of gender. Table 3 
presents values of goodness-of-fit for the male (Mmen) and female (Mfemale) samples. Results 
revealed that both data sets showed good fit.   
Although the specified model showed a good fit to the data sets, results should not be 
viewed as implying that the same parameter values adequately describe the responses of both 
genders (Li, Harmer, & Acock, 1996). Having established that there might be invariance across 
gender, multigroup analyses were conducted imposing equality constraints firstly on the paths 
(Mpaths) and secondly on the paths and errors (Mpaths+ errors). Table 3 summarizes the results of the 
constrained models. There are two important suppositions underlying this analysis. First, as a 
general rule, multigroup model analysis has larger χ2 values and second, multigroup analysis does 
not produce a better fitting model compared to any single group model owing to the fact that if 
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one sample had a poorer fit than the other this would lead to a discrepancy in the fit of the 
multigroup model (Manolis, Winsor, & True, 1999).  
As previously mentioned, the inflated χ2 in Table 3 was expected. Having looked at the 
Lagrange multiplier test it was identified that χ2 could be reduced by releasing the path between 
social anxiety and somatic anxiety owing to the tendency for the path to be stronger in one of 
the groups. A review of the single-sample models revealed that this path was stronger for 
women compared to men. In addition, following the Mpaths +errors analysis, the Lagrange 
multiplier test indicated that χ2 could be improved if the error constraint on somatic anxiety was 
released. This was expected given the variation in path strength highlighted above. Finally, the 
path between social anxiety and style consciousness was also highlighted as a weak path; 
however, as it was not evident in previous analyses, it is reasonable to speculate that it could be 
attributed to random error.     
Discussion 
 The main purpose of the present study was to specify an a priori path model representing 
the relationship between self-consciousness and competition anxiety. Additionally, the potential 
moderating effect of gender on the path model was explored. Specifically, it was hypothesized 
that the dimensions of self-consciousness would predict trait anxiety via the mediator of social 
anxiety and that this relationship would be moderated by gender.  
Relationship Between Self-Consciousness and Competition Anxiety 
Specification of the path model highlighted several interesting issues. As hypothesized, all 
factors of self-consciousness were related to competition anxiety through the mediator of social 
anxiety. This supports the initial work by Fenigstein et al. (1975) and more recent work, in that 
concerns with self-presentation can result in social anxiety (Wilson & Eklund, 1998), and that 
self-consciousness plays a significant role in the development of anxiety (e.g., Gibbons, 1990). 
Moreover, social anxiety is a dimension of the anxiety concept, so it is tenable that a relationship 
was present with the other dimensions of anxiety.  
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As evident in Figure 2, a stronger path exists between social anxiety and the cognitive 
anxiety factor of worry when compared to its link with the somatic anxiety factor. This may be so 
because, by definition, cognitive anxiety is “known to the individual” whereas sources of somatic 
anxiety are not necessarily known; feeling anxious does not necessitate or entail the recognition 
of a source (Wilson & Eklund, 1998) and may just “be elicited by conditioned responses to non-
evaluative environmental stimuli” (Wilson & Eklund, 1998, p. 94). Thus, supporting the 
contention that there are potentially different antecedents for the subcomponents of anxiety (Lane, 
Terry, & Karageorghis, 1995; Parfitt, Jones, & Hardy, 1990) 
The conceptualization of two subcomponents of private self-consciousness and the 
relationship they display with social anxiety support contentions that internal state awareness and 
self-reflection are differentially related to forms of psychological dysfunction (Anderson et al., 
1996), specifically, internal state awareness displays relative adjustment while self-reflection 
displays relative maladjustment with social anxiety. The components of public self-consciousness 
are also differentially related to psychological dysfunction. It is conceivable that this 
differentiation highlights why previous researchers (e.g., Kim et al., 1999; Ingram, 1990) have 
reported contradictory evidence. Thus, future research should ensure that a distinction is made 
between subcomponents of self-consciousness in order for the true relationships and mechanisms 
underlying the relationship between self-focused attention and psychopathology to be established. 
Negative correlations between internal state awareness, appearance consciousness, and 
social anxiety although small, have practical implications insofar as enhancing these factors may 
be associated with lower social anxiety. In terms of internal state awareness, if a sportsperson is 
aware of their emotions and physiological state they may be able to monitor and control their 
focus of attention with effective intervention strategies, thus promoting their motivational 
tendencies and minimizing the extent to which they experience negative affect. In a similar 
manner, an awareness of one’s appearance may cause distraction from other potentially harmful 
stimuli; focusing on the way one looks and improving appearance may help promote positive 
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feelings and consequently diminish negative environmental effects. Therefore, they could be 
considered as adaptive means of attending to the self.  
Owing to the small parameter estimates, the above recommendations should be viewed 
with caution. The small parameter values can be attributed to the relatively poor reliability 
estimates obtained for the present data; specifically, Cronbach’s alpha for the rSCS subscales of 
self-reflection (.64) and internal state awareness (.53) subscales are below the recommended 
lower threshold of .7 (Nunnally, 1978), while the remaining subscales display Cronbach alpha 
values just above this level. Therefore, it can be recommended that further research is required to 
examine the internal consistency of the subscales. The insignificant path between self-reflection 
and social anxiety could be attributed to global judgments made about the self. Self-rumination 
leaves individuals vulnerable to psychopathological symptoms (e.g., depression), as it fails to 
provide feedback about potentially remediable aspects of the self (Martin & Debus, 1999). 
Therefore, the impact that it has on the degree to which one experiences social anxiety may be 
minimal, and is reflected in the small parameters.    
 Consistent with previous research (e.g., Alanazi, 2001; Gould et al., 1983; Jones et al., 
1991; Larry, 2000; Wells, 1985), descriptive statistics indicated that women were dispositionally 
more self-focused than men, and reported higher levels of trait anxiety. Significant differences 
were found between all aspects of anxiety as well as style consciousness. With partial eta squared 
effect sizes ranging from .01 to .05, it can be tentatively suggested that some females are more 
concerned with behavioral and stylistic elements of their public image compared to males. Thus, 
providing some support for the contentions of Martin and Debus (1999) regarding the negative 
association between self-focus and an individual’s perception of themselves and their behavior in 
the presence of others. Consequently, it can be argued that for situations in which the self 
becomes perceptually salient, deviations in the environment may be more readily perceived by 
females, resulting in higher levels of competition anxiety when compared to males. Interestingly, 
these differences did not represent significant invariance when multigroup analysis was 
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conducted across gender. Therefore, it can be suggested that, in a sport context, both genders are 
equally vulnerable to cognitive distraction. Moran (1996) asserted that in the sporting 
environment, the presence of external stimuli can exaggerate performers’ sensitivity to their 
internal mental state and internal mental processes often present a greater challenge than 
overcoming external distractions. Jackson (1995) has reported that thinking excessively about 
oneself and/or about what might happen in the future can inhibit performance. 
In contrast to these negative perceptions, it must be recognized that concerns about the 
self and performance can also be associated with an appropriate mental focus for competition e.g., 
athletes can interpret anxiety as being facilitative. Loehr (1986) stated that a balance needs to be 
struck and that individuals need to manage their emotions effectively in order to facilitate optimal 
performance. Based on the empirical evidence presented herein, practitioners should consider 
employing strategies that help control the degree to which individuals focus on themselves. 
Additionally, by enhancing the protective strategies that act as buffers between the ego and the 
environment it may, in turn, help to reduce or eliminate the debilitating effect of emotions such as 
self-consciousness and anxiety, or even promote the feelings as facilitative (Gibbons, 1990).  
Factor Structure of the rSCS 
The tenability of the rSCS factor structure was examined. It is recognized as a limitation 
of the present study that the fit indexes showed only marginally acceptable fit. However, the 
present study did not set out to re-design the rSCS but to propose and investigate the previously 
equivocal relationship between self-consciousness and competition anxiety. Therefore, path 
analyses commenced using the best fitting model indicated by the present data (the 5-factor 
model by Mittal & Balasubramanian, 1987). It is recommended that future research investigates 
and re-addresses the competing factor structures of the rSCS and assesses the environmental 
conditions that may differentially or even independently activate aspects of the multidimensional 
concept (Nasby, 1996). 
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Factor Structure of the SAS 
CFA demonstrated that the data could be best explained by the 3-factor measurement 
model proposed by Dunn et al. (2000). They supported Smith et al.’s (1990) contention that the 
SAS is a multidimensional measure assessing three dimensions of trait anxiety; however, their 
perception and formulation of the worry and concentration disruption subscales was slightly 
different. Present results reinforce the findings of Dunn et al. (2000) thus it can be recommended 
that when utilizing relatively new psychometric measures it is beneficial to assess their 
psychometric properties, and confirm their factor structure (Gorsuch, 1983).   
Conclusions 
The present study demonstrated that, in support of the a priori model, self-reported levels 
of self-consciousness displayed a positive relationship with trait anxiety via the mediator of social 
anxiety. Future research should attempt to further explore the complex relationship between the 
constructs, and the various mechanisms within the sporting environment that may impact on this 
relationship. With reference to the moderating effects of gender, the research hypothesis was 
rejected. However, differences in the socialization of males and females could be examined to 
identify exactly which factors trigger greater self-presentational concerns and anxiety symptoms 
among females. The understanding of such mechanisms may help to facilitate the structure of 
counseling, the design of interventions and the organization of practice environments to assist in 
maximizing the control an athlete has over his or her pre-competition mental state. Additionally, 
further tests of the factor structure and more rigorous validation of the measures employed 
appears warranted in light of the numerous empirical issues highlighted in the present study. 
Finally, a replication of the study in a physical education context may further understanding of 
the self-presentational concerns experienced by pupils and the subsequent anxiety they may feel   
during physical education classes. Such work could have long-term implications for pupils’ 
choice to participate in sport and physical activity. 
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Table 1  
Goodness-of-fit Indexes for the Competing Factor Models of the rSCS and SAS 
Model  χ2 CFI  SRMR RMSEA AIC 
rSCS 1 746.34 (206)* .82 .08 .08 334.34 
rSCS 2 628.77 (164)* .84 .08 .08 300.77 
rSCS 3 665.73 (183)* .83 .08 .08 299.72 
rSCS 4 3057.14 (267)* .18 .21 .15 2523.14 
rSCS 5 550.68 (160)* .86 .07 .07 230.68 
SAS 1 770.82 (186)* .88 .09 .08 398.82 
SAS 2 660.49 (186)* .90 .06 .07 288.49 
 
Note. χ2 degrees of freedom are shown in brackets after the test statistic. 
*p < .001.
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for the rSCS (Mittal & Balasubramanian, 1987) and SAS (Dunn et al. 
2000) Factors and ANOVA for Gender Differences 
 Male Female All participants  
Variable M SD M SD M SD F (1, 422) Partial η2 
SR 5.73 2.37 5.48 2.24 5.61 2.31 1.30 .00 
ISA 5.26 1.66 5.46 1.66 5.36 1.63 1.60 .00 
STC 7.08 2.52 7.66 2.41 7.35 2.48   6.01*  .01 
AC 5.71 2.04 6.05 2.05 5.87 2.05 3.28 .01 
SA 8.01 3.91 9.84 3.74 8.86 3.94   25.28* .05 
SomA 18.17 5.39 21.05 6.29 19.50 5.99  26.96* .06 
W 19.27 5.66 21.30 5.32 16.49 4.62  14.96* .03 
CD 5.25 2.08 5.72 1.98 9.19 2.99  5.91* .01 
 
Note. SR = Self-Reflection; ISA = Internal State Awareness; STC = Style Consciousness; AC = 
Appearance Consciousness; SA = Social Anxiety; SomA = Somatic Anxiety; W = Worry; CD 
= Concentration Disruption.  
*p < .05. 
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Table 3 
Goodness-of-Fit Indexes for the a priori Models, the Specified Single Group Models, and for 
the Tests of Invariance Across Gender 
Model χ2    CFI    SRMR    RMSEA    AIC 
M1   31.05 (12)** .98 .06 .06 7.05 
M2   25.28 (10)** .98 .05 .06 5.28 
M3 25.03 (10)** .98 .05 .06 5.03 
Mmen   16.47 (12) .98 .07 .06 -7.53 
Mfemale   12.97 (12) .99 .09 .03 -11.03 
Mpaths   38.43 (30) .98 .08 .04 -21.58 
Mpaths + errors   54.56 (38)* .96 .10 .05 -21.44 
 
Note. M1 = Figure 1, Model 1; M2 = Figure 1, Model 2; M3 = Figure 1, Model 3.  
χ2 degrees of freedom are shown in brackets after the test statistic. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Hypothesized conceptual path models representing relationships between self-
consciousness and competition anxiety. 
 
Figure 2. Path model representing relationships between self-consciousness and competition 
anxiety. All parameters are standardized. The magnitude of parameters is indicated by the 
structural coefficient (shown beside arrows) and all are significant (p < .001) apart from the path 
between self-reflection and social anxiety.  
Note. Residual correlations were as follows: Somatic Anxiety, Worry = .59; Social Anxiety, 
Concentration Disruption = .16; Worry, Concentration Disruption = .39.  
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